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Abstract 
Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) proposed extensions of the sequential 
generalized Lorenz dominance (SGL) criterion that was proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987): 
the extended version of SGL made it possible to compare distributions for different demographics. 
However, the tests to check the extended SGL “are not expressible in terms of generalized Lorenz 
curves” (Lambert 2001, p.79). In this paper, we show that the dominance condition can be easily 
checked by sequential comparisons of a modified version of the generalized Lorenz curve. We apply 
this procedure by comparing the income distributions of Italian households using data obtained from the 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW, Bank of Italy) from 2006 and 2012.  
 
Keywords: Sequential generalized Lorenz dominance; welfare ordering; different demographics 
JEL codes: D31, D63. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
In the literature of income inequality, the heterogeneity of individuals or households is an 
important issue. For a population that is classified into various groups that are homogeneous in 
attributes other than income, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) proposed a set of dominance 
criteria, including the sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGL)1.  
The SGL is attractive for several reasons. First, the SGL enables us to obtain welfare 
orderings without rigorous specification of a utility function. In particular, when heterogeneity 
among households arises from a difference in household size, the SGL can provide a welfare 
ordering without relying on specific equivalence scales. Second, the SGL criterion can be easily 
checked by using the familiar generalized Lorenz (GL) curves that were proposed by Shorrocks 
                                                  
1 In the subsequent analysis, the characteristics of the SGL ordering have been considered. Ok and Lambert (1999) 
revealed that a social welfare function (SWF) supports the SGL ordering if and only if it is needs-based. Ebert (2000) 
provided a characterization of SGL ordering based on transfer principles. Ooghe (2007) argued that the SGL ordering 
is equivalent to the welfare orderings under the utilitarian SWFs which gives a larger weight to the needy households.    
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(1983), sequentially. 
The SGL is applicable when we wish to predict the distributional impact induced by a 
policy change.2 However, the SGL can only be used for comparison when considering a fixed 
demographic composition. It cannot be used to compare the distributions of groups that have 
different compositions. In practice, international or intertemporal income distributions are often 
compared; these usually have different demographic compositions. 
Jenkins and Lambert (1993) extended the SGL to cases in which there are demographic 
differences. They imposed an additional restriction on the utility function and showed a 
sufficient condition for welfare dominance in the presence of demographic differences. 
Hereafter we refer to their dominance criterion as the extended SGL. Chambaz and Maurin 
(1998) showed that this sufficient condition is a necessary condition for welfare dominance. 
These analyses rely on the second-order stochastic dominance condition in order to 
compare income distributions.3 Thus, the analytical procedure that checks the extended SGL 
uses distribution functions rather than the GL curves. Indeed, in his informative textbook, 
Lambert (2001) argued that the tests to confirm the extended SGL “require the analyst to use 
numerical integration techniques to compute areas under distribution functions” (Lambert, 2001. 
p.79). 
In this paper, we show that the dominance conditions proposed by Jenkins and Lambert 
(1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) can be easily checked by using a slightly modified 
version of the GL curves. That is, as in an SGL comparison with unchanged demographic 
compositions, the welfare-dominance relation can be investigated without the comparison of 
distribution functions, even in the presence of demographic differences. In addition to welfare 
ordering, Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) applied their dominance 
conditions to the analysis of poverty. Our procedure can also be used to check the poverty gap 
dominance when there are demographic differences. 
Our procedure for checking the dominance relation is quite simple. When comparing two 
populations with unequal numbers of low-income households, we add virtual households to the 
smaller population so that the two are equalized. Using these adjusted distributions, we compare 
their welfare by using the GL curves. This procedure is not only simple, but the results can be 
shown visually by using the familiar GL curve. 
As mentioned above, the procedures proposed in this paper add nothing to the existing 
dominance criteria. Rather, we make clearer the implication of the extended SGL criterion by 
providing its simple representation. The SGL criterion is said to be too robust to compare 
                                                  
2 For example, López-Laborda and Onrubia (2005) applied the idea of the SGL to a regional context and considered 
the decentralization of a tax system that results in better regional welfare than did the initial unified tax system. 
3 Based on the first-, second- and third-order stochastic dominance conditions, Lambert and Ramos (2002) provide 
the sequential tests for checking welfare dominance when there are demographic differences.  
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income distributions although its generality corresponds to broad class of utility functions4. 
Since the procedure proposed in this paper can be easily implemented, researchers who employ 
the dominance criteria other than the extended SGL can confirm the robustness of their 
judgements. On the other hand, Moyes (2012) argued that the welfare implication by the 
extended SGL highly depends on the maximum level of conceivable income. The graphical 
representation by the GL curves can clearly show the change in welfare judgements induced by 
a change in the maximum conceivable income. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the analytical 
framework. In Section 3, we will show the results for the welfare dominance relation. In Section 
4, we consider its application for poverty analysis. In Section 5, the proposed procedures are 
applied to the comparison of the distributions of Italian households. In the last section, we 
present some closing remarks. 
 
 
2 Analytical Framework 
Consider two societies X and Y, consisting of ݊ሺ൐ 1ሻ households5. In each society, households 
are classified into ܪሺ2 ൑ ܪ ൑ ݊ሻ groups according to their needs for income. Let ࣢ ൌ
ሼ1,… ,ܪሽ be the set of groups, where ݄ ∈ ࣢ denotes the ݄-th needy group. Let ࣨሺ݄ሻ be the 
set of households who belong to the h-th group. We denote by ܰሺ݄ሻ ൒ 0 the number of 
households classified into the ݄-th group: ܰሺ݄ሻ ൌ #ࣨሺ݄ሻ. Furthermore, denote by ෩ࣨ ሺ݄ሻ ൌ
⋃ ࣨሺ݆ሻ௛௝ୀଵ  the set of households having a type lower or equal than ݄ . It follows that 
෩ܰሺ݄ሻ ൌ 	# ෩ࣨ ሺ݄ሻ  is such that ෩ܰሺ݄ሻ ൌ ∑ ܰሺ݆ሻ௛௝ୀଵ . Obviously, ෩ܰሺܪሻ ൌ ∑ ܰሺ݄ሻ௛∈࣢ ൌ ݊ . 
Hereafter, without loss of generality, we set ࣨሺ݄ሻ ൌ ൛ ෩ܰሺ݄ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1,… , ෩ܰሺ݄ሻൟ for ݄ ∈ ࣢ 
and ෩ܰሺ0ሻ ൌ 0. 
The distribution of income in society X can be represented by an n-dimensional row vector 
ܠ ൌ ሺݔଵ, … , ݔ௡ሻ, where ݔ௜ ∈ ሾ0, ̅ݒሿ is the income of the i-th household, and ̅ݒ is the maximum 
conceivable income level. The distribution of income in the ݄-th group can be represented by 
an ௑ܰሺ݄ሻ-dimensional vector ܠ௛ ൌ ሺݔே෩೉ሺ௛ିଵሻାଵ, … , ݔே෩೉ሺ௛ሻሻ. Combining ܠ௛s, we denote by 
ܠ෤௛ income profile of households whose needs are no more than ݄: ܠ෤௛ ൌ ൫ݔଵ, … , ݔே෩೉ሺ௛ሻ൯. 
Obviously, ܠ෤ு ൌ ܠ holds. For the later discussions, we denote by ܠ෤↑௛: ൌ ሺݔሺଵሻ௛ , … , ݔሺே෩೉ሺ௛ሻሻ௛ ሻ 
the vector obtained by rearranging the entries of ܠ෤௛  into ascending order6: ݔሺଵሻ௛ ൑,… ,൑
                                                  
4 For detail discussion, see Fleurbaey et al. (2003). 
5 While Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) focus on the continuous distribution, present 
analysis is based on discrete distribution of income. As discussed in Fishburn and Vickson (1978) and Muliere and 
Scarsini (1989), present analysis is compatible with existing results based on continuous distribution. 
6 That is, ܠ෤↑௛ is obtained by some permutation matrix Π as ܠ෤↑௛ ൌ ܠ෤௛Π. It should be noted that ݔሺ௝ሻ௛ ൌ ݔሺ௝ሻ௞  does 
not necessarily hold for ݄, ݇ ∈ ࣢ and ݆ ∈ ෩ࣨ௑ሺ݄ሻ ∩ ෩ࣨ௑ሺ݇ሻ. 
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ݔሺே෩೉ሺ௛ሻሻ௛ . Similarly, the income distribution in society Y can be represented by an n-dimensional 
vector ࢟ ൌ ሺݕଵ, … , ݕ௡ሻ and ݕ௜ ∈ ሾ0, ̅ݒሿ, which is decomposed according to the level of the 
need, that is, ܡ ൌ ሾܡଵ, … , ܡுሿ, where ܡ௛ ൌ ሺݕே෩ೊሺ௛ିଵሻାଵ, … , ݕே෩ೊሺ௛ሻሻ is the ௒ܰሺ݄ሻ-dimensional 
vector. As in society X, we define vectors ܡ෤௛ and ܡ෤↑௛. 
 
 
3 Welfare Dominance and GL Comparisons 
We denote by ܷሺݕ, ݄ሻ the social valuation – utility hereafter – of an household having 
income ݕ ∈ ሾ0, ൅∞ሻ and ݄ ∈ ࣢ . The household utility function is continuous and twice 
differentiable with respect to income. We denote by ࣯ the set of such functions. Jenkins and 
Lambert (1993), and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) assume the following hypotheses, where ଵܷ 
is the first derivative of ܷ	according to its first argument: 
 
 
 
 
According to Jenkins and Lambert (1993), and Chambaz and Maurin (1998), we introduce the 
following class of utility function: 
 
 
We then assume that the social planner is endowed with a utilitarian social welfare 
function: 
 
 
For society Y, we define by ௒ܹ ൌ ሺ1 ݊⁄ ሻ∑ ∑ ܷሺݕ௜, ݄ሻ௜∈ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ௛∈࣢  the social welfare.  
Let ܨ௑ሺݔ|݄ሻ be the conditional cumulative distribution function at income ݔ ∈ ሾ0, ൅∞ሻ 
and for type ݄ ∈ ࣢ . Chambaz and Maurin (1998) have shown that the following two 
conditions are equivalent (Chambaz and Maurin, 1998, Proposition 2).  
U1. ଵܷሺݕ, 1ሻ ൒ ଵܷሺݕ, 2ሻ ൒,… ,൒ ଵܷሺݕ, ܪሻ ൒ 0, ∀ݕ ൑ ̅ݒ,  
U2. ܷሺ̅ݒ, 1ሻ ൌ ܷሺ̅ݒ, 2ሻ ൌ,… , ൌ ܷሺ̅ݒ, ܪሻ,  
U3. ଵܷଵሺݕ, 1ሻ ൑ ଵܷଵሺݕ, 2ሻ ൑,… ,൑ ଵܷଵሺݕ, ܪሻ ൑ 0, ∀ݕ ൑ ݒ.ഥ   
 ࣯௃௅ ൌ ሼܷ ∈ ࣯:U1, U2 and U3 are satisfiedሽ.  
 ௑ܹ ൌ
1
݊ ෍ ෍ ܷሺݔ௜, ݄ሻ௜∈ࣨ౔ሺ௛ሻ௛∈࣢
. (1)
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 ௑ܹ ൒ ௒ܹ ∀ܷ ∈ ࣯௃௅, (A)
 
 ෍න ൣݍ௝,௑ܨ௑ሺߦ|݆ሻ െ ݍ௝,௒ܨ௒ሺߦ|݆ሻ൧݀ߦ ൑ 0
௧
଴
௛
௝ୀଵ
∀ݐ ൑ ̅ݒ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (B)
 
where ݍ௝,௑ ൌ ௑ܰሺ݆ሻ ݊⁄  denotes the household share of the type ݆ ∈ ࣢. 
Moyes (2012) gives a simple representation of condition (B) by using joint distribution 
function. Let ܨሺݔ, ݄ሻ be the joint distribution function at income ݔ ∈ ሾ0, ൅∞ሻ and for 
type ݄ ∈ ࣢. Noting that ܨ௑ሺݔ, ݄ሻ ൌ ∑ ݍ௝,௑ܨ௑ሺݔ|݆ሻ௛௝ୀଵ , we can replace (B) with the following 
condition. 
 
 න ሾܨ௑ሺߦ, ݄ሻ െ ܨ௒ሺߦ, ݄ሻሿ݀ߦ
௧
଴
൑ 0 ∀ݐ ൑ ̅ݒ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (B’)
 
Since our concern is discrete distribution, condition (B’) can be rewritten as follows7:  
 
 
1
݊ ቎ ෍ ሺݐ െ ݔ௜ሻ
ା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ
െ ෍ ሺݐ െ ݕ௜ሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ
቏ ൑ 0 ∀ݐ ൑ ݒഥ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢, (B2)
 
where ሺܽሻା ൌ maxሼ0, ܽሽ. If we consider the situation of ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൌ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ ∀݄ ∈ ࣢, the GL 
comparison is directly applicable. To connect condition (B) to the GL dominance criterion, we 
present the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 1  The following condition is equivalent to condition (B2). 
 
 
෍ ሺݐ െ ݔ௜ሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ
െ ෍ ሺݐ െ ݕ௜ሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ
െ ቀ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ െ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻቁ ሺݐ െ ̅ݒሻା ൑ 0, 	∀ݐ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ,
∀݄ ∈ ࣢. 
(B3)
 
Proof  First, (B3) is equivalent to (B2) if we consider the case of ݐ ൑ ݒത in (B3). For ݐ ∈ ሺݒ,∞ሻ, 
(B3) is reduced to ∑ ሺ̅ݒ െ ݔ௜ሻା௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ െ ∑ ሺ̅ݒ െ ݕ௜ሻା௜∈ ෩ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ ൑ 0, which implies (B2). ∎ 
 
                                                  
7 For example, see Moyes (1999). 
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Now, in order to connect the result by the Chambaz and Maurin (1998) to the GL curves 
comparison, we modify the income vectors. Let ܞ௛ ൌ ሺ̅ݒ, … , ̅ݒሻ	 be a ห ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ െ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻห 
dimensional vector whose entries are all equal to ̅ݒ. Let ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ ൌ max൛෩ܰܺሺ݄ሻ, ෩ܻܰሺ݄ሻൟ. By using 
ܞ௛, we define the following vector for ݄ ∈ ࣢.  
 
 ܠො௛ ൌ ሺݔොଵ௛, … , ݔොே෡ሺ௛ሻ௛ ሻ ൌ ቊ
ܠ෤↑௛ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൒ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ
ൣܠ෤↑௛, ܞ௛൧ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൏ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ
 (2a)
 
That is, ܠො௛  is a ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ -dimensional vector whose j-th entry, ݔො௝௛ ൌ ݔ෤ሺ௝ሻ௛  for ݆ ∈ ෩ࣨ௑ሺ݄ሻ . If 
෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൏ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ , then ݔො௝௛ ൌ ̅ݒ  for ݆ ൌ ෩ܰܺሺ݄ሻ ൅ 1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ . Since ̅ݒ  is possible maximum 
income, ݔොଵ௛ ൑,… ,൑ ݔොே෡ሺ௛ሻ௛  holds. Similarly, we define 
 
 ܡො௛ ൌ ሺݕොଵ௛, … , ݕොே෡ሺ௛ሻ௛ ሻ ൌ ቊ
ܡ෤↑௛ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൑ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ
ൣܡ෤↑௛, ܞ௛൧ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൐ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ
 (2b)
 
The following result is well-known in the theory of majorization8.  
 
Lemma 2  Condition (B3) is equivalent to the following condition. 
 
 ෍ݔො௝௛
௥
௝ୀଵ
൒෍ݕො௝௛
௥
௝ୀଵ
, ݎ ൌ 1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (B4)
 
Proof  See Marshall et al. (2011, Proposition B.4, p.158). ∎ 
 
Now, we consider the GL curve for the virtual distribution ܠො௛. As well-known in the literature, 
the GL curve is given by the second-order inverse distribution function for a given distribution9. 
Let ܩܮሺܠ, ݌ሻ for ݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ be the GL function for ܠ. According to Moyes (1999), we can 
represent the GL function as follows:  
 
 ܩܮ ቀܠො݄, ݌ቁ ൌ ෍ ቆ݌ െ ݆ െ 1෡ܰሺ݄ሻቇ
௞൫௣;ே෡ሺ௛ሻ൯
௝ୀଵ
൫ݔො௝௛ െ ݔො௝ିଵ௛ ൯ for ݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ and	݄ ∈ ࣢, (3)
 
with ݔො଴௛ ൌ 0, where ݇ ≔ min൛݇ ∈ ൛1, .2, … , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻൟ: ݌ ൑ ݇ ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ⁄ ൟ. Similarly, we can define the 
                                                  
8 In the theory of majorization, it is said that ܡො௛ weakly super-majorizes ܠො௛ if and only if (B4) holds (e.g., 
Marshall et al. 2011). 
9 For example, see Gastwirth(1971). 
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GL function for ܡො௛ as ܩܮሺܡො݄, ݌ሻ. 
    Our main result can be summarized by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  The following two conditions are equivalent. 
 
 ௑ܹ ൒ ௒ܹ, ∀ܷ ∈ ࣯௃௅, (A)
 
 ܩܮሺܠො݄, ݌ሻ ൒ ܩܮሺܡො݄, ݌ሻ ∀݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (B5)
 
Proof  From Lemmas 1 and 2, it is confirmed that (A)⇔(B4). Thus, we will prove (B4)⇔(B5). 
We can rewrite (3) as follows: 
 
 ܩܮሺܠො݄, ݌ሻ ൌ 1෡ܰሺ݄ሻ ൞ߙ ቀ݌; ෡ܰሺ݄ሻቁ ෍ ݔො௝
௛
௞൫௣;ே෡ሺ௛ሻ൯
௝ୀଵ
൅ ቂ1 െ ߙ ቀ݌; ෡ܰሺ݄ሻቁቃ ෍ ݔො௝௛
௞൫௣;ே෡ሺ௛ሻ൯ିଵ
௝ୀ଴
ൢ, (4)
 
where ߙሺ݌; ෡ܰሺ݄ሻሻ ≡ ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ݌ െ ݇ሺ݌; ෡ܰሺ݄ሻሻ ൅ 1 ∈ ሾ0, 1ሿ. From (4), it is obvious that (B5) holds if 
(B4) is fulfilled. Next, suppose that ∑ ݔො௝௛శ௥శ௝ୀଵ ൏ ∑ ݕො௝௛శ௥శ௝ୀଵ  for some ݎା ∈ ሼ1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻሽ and 
݄ା ∈ ࣢ . Taking ݌ ൌ ݎା/ ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻ , we have ݇ሺݎା ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻ⁄ ; ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻሻ ൌ ݎା  and 
ߙሺݎା ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻ⁄ ; ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻሻ ൌ 1. Therefore, ܩܮሺܠො݄൅, ݎା ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻ⁄ ሻ ൏ ܩܮሺܡො݄൅, ݎା ෡ܰሺ݄ାሻ⁄ ሻ.  ∎  
 
Proposition 1 implies that the dominance criterion discussed by Chambaz and Maurin 
(1998) can be easily checked by sequential comparisons of the modified GL curves.  
 
Example 1 Suppose we have the following distributions of income partitioned into three 
subgroups: 
 
ܠଵ ൌ ሺ2, 5, 8ሻ, ܠଶ ൌ ሺ4, 6, 10, 12ሻ, ܠଷ ൌ ሺ3, 7, 9ሻ, 
 
ܡଵ ൌ ሺ2, 3, 8, 9ሻ, ܡଶ ൌ ሺ1, 4ሻ, ܡଷ ൌ ሺ5, 6, 7, 15ሻ. 
 
Suppose that ̅ݒ ൌ 15. Let us consider the dominance condition stated in Proposition 1. We can 
draw the GL curves of ܠො௛ and ܡො௛ for ݄ ∈ ሼ1,2,3ሽ as in Figure 1 (a)–(c), where the dotted 
lines in (a) and (b) correspond to ܞത. It is clear from Figure 1 that the dominance condition is 
met. Furthermore, since ∑ ݔ௜௡෤೉
మ
௜ୀଵ െ ∑ ݕ௜௡෤ೊ
మ
௜ୀଵ ൌ 20, we can confirm that ௑ܹ ൒ ௒ܹ  holds for 
̅ݒ ൑ 20.   
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[Figure 1 placed here] 
 
When investigating the welfare dominance condition, it is important to determine to what 
extent the differences in needs should be considered. In the above example, if we allow for the 
difference in utility between the second and third needy groups in income larger than 20, the 
welfare dominance condition is violated. As an extreme case, if ̅ݒ approaches to infinity, ܠ is 
never preferred to ܡ  in the sense of the extended SGL unless ෩ܰ௑௛ ൑ ෩ܰ௒௛  holds for all 
݄ ∈ ࣢\ሼܪሽ. We will discuss this point in the later section. 
 
 
4  Poverty Dominance 
The argument presented above can be applied to the analysis of poverty. First, let ݖ௛̅ ∈ Թା 
be the poverty line for the households in type ݄ ∈ ࣢. According to the literature, we will 
consider the profiles of the poverty lines in decreasing order.10 That is, ݖଵ̅ ൒,… ,൒ ݖு̅. Let ࣴ 
be a set of H-dimensional vectors ࣴ ≡ ሼሺݖଵ̅, … , ݖு̅ሻ: ݖଵ̅ ൒,… ,൒ ݖு̅ሽ. The profile of poverty line 
is represented as ܢത ൌ ሺݖଵ̅, … , ݖு̅ሻ ∈ ࣴ.  
For society X, we consider the following poverty measure: 
 
௑ܲሺܢതሻ ൌ ෍ ෍ ܲሺݔ௜, ݖ௛ሻ
௜∈ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ௛∈࣢
, ܢത ∈ ࣴ, (5)
 
For society Y, we consider the poverty measure ௒ܲሺܢതሻ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܲሺݕ௜, ݖ௛ሻ௜∈ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ௛∈࣢ . The 
function ܲሺݕ, ݖሻ is continuous and twice differentiable with respect to income. We denote by 
࣪ the set of such functions. According to Chambaz and Maurin (1998), we assume the 
following properties, where ଵܲ is the first derivative of ܲ with respect to its first argument. 
 
 
 
                                                  
10 For example, see Atkinson (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), and Chambaz and Maurin (1998). 
P1. ଵܲሺݕ, ݖଵሻ ൑ ଵܲሺݕ, ݖଶሻ ൑, … ,൑ ଵܲሺݕ, ݖுሻ ൑ 0, ∀ݕ ൑ ̅ݒ,  
P2. ൜ܲሺݕ, ݖ௛ሻ ൒ 0 ݂݅ ݕ ൑ ݖ௛, ∀ݕ ൑ ̅ݒ ܽ݊݀ ∀݄ ∈ ࣢, 	ܲሺݕ, ݖ௛ሻ ൌ 0 ݂݅ ݕ ൐ ݖ௛, ∀ݕ ൑ ̅ݒ ܽ݊݀ ∀݄ ∈ ࣢,   
P3. ଵܲଵሺݕ, ݖଵሻ ൒ ଵܲଵሺݕ, ݖଶሻ ൒,… , ൒ ଵܲଵሺݕ, ݖுሻ ൒ 0, ∀ݕ ൑ ݒ.ഥ   
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All assumptions are employed in Chambaz and Maurin (1998). For a given profile of 
poverty lines ܢത ∈ ࣴ, we will denote as ஼࣪ெሺܢതሻ the class of the poverty indices that satisfy 
P1-P3.  
 
 
Poverty dominance condition presented by Chambaz and Maurin (1998) states that the 
following two conditions are equivalent (Chambaz and Maurin, 1998, Proposition 4).  
 
 ௑ܲ ൑ ௒ܲ, ∀ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺܢതሻ, ܢത ∈ ࣴ, (C)
 
 ෍න ൣݍ௝,௑ܨ௑ሺߦ|݆ሻ െ ݍ௝,௒ܨ௒ሺߦ|݆ሻ൧݀ߦ
௧
଴
௛
௝ୀଵ
൑ 0, ∀ݐ ൑ ݖ௛̅, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢ ܽ݊݀	ܢത ∈ ࣴ. (D)
 
As in condition (B), noting that ∑ ׬ ݍ௝,௑ܨ௑ሺߦ|݆ሻ݀ߦ௧଴ ൌ ׬ ܨ௑ሺߦ, ݄ሻ݀ߦ
௧
଴
௛௝ୀଵ  holds, we can 
rewrite (D) as  
 
 
1
݊ ቎ ෍ ሺݐ െ ݔ௜ሻ
ା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ ܺሺ݄ሻ
െ ෍ ሺݐ െ ݕ௜ሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ ܻሺ݄ሻ
቏ ൑ 0 ∀ݐ ∈ ሾ0, ݖ௛̅ሿ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢.	 (D2)
 
We can state the following Lemma which corresponds to Lemma 1.  
 
Lemma 3 The following condition is equivalent to Condition (D2).  
 
 
෍ ሺݐ െminሼݔ௜, ݖ௛̅ሽሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ
െ ෍ ሺݐ െminሼݔ௜, ݖ௛̅ሽሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨೊሺ௛ሻ
െ ቀ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ െ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻቁ ሺݐ െ ݖ௛̅ሻା
൑ 0,			∀ݐ ∈ ሾ0,∞ሻ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. 
(D3)
 
Proof Noting that ݐ െ minሼݔ, ݖ௛̅ሽ ൌ ሺݔ െ ݖ௛̅ሻା ൅ ݐ െ ݔ, we obtain ሺݐ െ minሼݔ, ݖ௛̅ሽሻା ൌ ሺݐ െ ݔሻ൅ 
∀ݐ ൑ ݖ௛̅. Thus, (D2) and (D3) are equivalent for ∀ݐ ∈ ሾ0, ݖ௛̅ሿ. For the case of ݐ ൐ ݖത݄, (D3) can 
be represented as follows:  
 
 ஼࣪ெሺܢሻ ൌ ሼܲ ∈ ࣪: P1, P2 and P3 are satisfied and ܢ ∈ ࣴሽ.  
10 
 
෍ ሺݐ െminሼݔ௜, ݖ௛̅ሽሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ
െ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻሺݐ െ ݖ௛̅ሻା ൌ ෍ ሺݖ௛̅ െ ݔ௜ሻା
௜∈ ෩ࣨ೉ሺ௛ሻ
		∀ݐ ∈ ሺݖ௛̅,∞ሻ, 
 
which implies (D2). ∎ 
 
When we focus on the poverty measurement, it is sufficient to consider the income below 
the corresponding poverty line. For ܠ෤↑௛, let ܠ෤↑௛∗ be a ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ-dimensional vector whose entries 
consist of the censored income by the poverty line: ݔሺ௜ሻ௛∗ ≔ min൛ݔሺ݅ሻ, ݖത݄ൟ  for ݅ ∈ ෩ࣨ௑ሺ݄ሻ : 
ܠ෤↑௛∗ ≡ ሺݔሺଵሻ௛∗ , … , ݔሺே෩೉ሺ௛ሻሻ௛∗ ሻ. In a similar way, we define ܡ෤↑௛∗ ≡ ሺݕ෤ሺ௜ሻ௛∗, … , ݕ෤ሺே෩ೊሺ௛ሻሻ௛∗ ሻ.  
To compare the distributions ܠ෤∗௛ and ܡ෤∗௛, we define a modified sub-vector, 
 
ුܠ௛: ൌ ቊൣܠ෤↑
௛∗, ܢത௛൧ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ ൐ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ,
ܠ෤↑௛∗ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ ൑ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ,
 (6a)
 
where ܢത௛ ≡ ሺݖ௛̅, … , ݖ௛̅ሻ is an ห ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ െ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻห-dimensional vector in which all of the entries 
are equal to the poverty line for the h-th group. From the definition, ුݔ௝௛ ൌ ݔሺ௝ሻ௛∗  for ݆ ∈ ෩ࣨ௑ሺ݄ሻ 
and ුݔ௝௛ ൌ ݖ௛̅ for ݆ ൌ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൅ 1,… , ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ if ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ ൐ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ. Similarly, we define 
 
ුܡ௛ ൌ ቊሾܡ෤↑
௛∗, ܢത௛ሿ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൐ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ,
ܡ෤↑௛∗ ݂݅ ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൑ ෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ.
 (6b)
 
It should be noted that ݖ௛̅ is the maximum value of the elements of ුܠ௛ and ුܡ௛. Thus, we can 
apply Lemma 1 and obtain the similar results for the welfare dominance. 
 
Lemma 4. Condition (D3) is equivalent to the following condition. 
 
 ෍ුݔ௝௛
௥
௝ୀଵ
൒෍ුݕ௝௛
௥
௝ୀଵ
, ݎ ൌ 1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (D4)
 
Proof. See Marshall et al. (2011, Proposition B.4, p.158). 
 
Now, we can state the poverty dominance condition based on the GL curves comparison. 
 
Proposition 2. The following two conditions are equivalent. 
 
 ௑ܲ ൑ ௒ܲ ∀ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺࢠതሻ, ࢠത ∈ ࣴ, (C)
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 ܩܮሺුܠ݄, ݌ሻ ൒ ܩܮሺුܡ݄, ݌ሻ ∀݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (D5)
 
Proof. (D4)⇔(D5) is confirmed by a similar way in Proposition 1. From Lemmas 3 and 4, we 
know (C)⇔(D4). 
  
The procedure for checking poverty dominance is straightforward. First, we draw the GL 
curve for each subgroup. Next, we modify the GL curves according to a poverty line that is set 
by researchers. Finally, by sequentially comparing the modified GL curves, we obtain insights 
into the poverty dominance. 
 
Example 2 Suppose that we have the following distributions of income partitioned into three 
subgroups. 
 
ܠଵ ൌ ሺ2, 5, 14ሻ, ܠଶ ൌ ሺ4, 5, 6, 10ሻ, ܠଷ ൌ ሺ3, 7, 20ሻ, 
 
ܡଵ ൌ ሺ1, 3, 4, 10ሻ, ܡଶ ൌ ሺ12, 15ሻ, ܡଷ ൌ ሺ2, 5, 7, 8ሻ. 
 
In this example, for any poverty line ࢠ ∈ ࣴ, we can easily confirm that ܩܮሺුܠ݄, ݌ሻ ൒
ܩܮሺුܡ݄, ݌ሻ, ∀݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ holds for ݄ ∈ ሼ1,3ሽ. However, the dominance relation between ුܠଶ and 
ුܡଶ is less clear, since it depends on the poverty line. Figure 2 (a) shows the cumulative income 
for each distribution. If we consider a relative low poverty line such as ݖଶ̅ ൌ 6, then condition 
(D5) holds, as shown in Figure 2 (b): this implies that ௑ܲ െ ௒ܲ ൒ 0 for all ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺܢതሻ and 
the poverty lines ܢത ൌ ሺݖത1, ݖത2, ݖത3ሻ, such as ݖതଵ ൒ ݖതଶ ൌ 6 ൒ ݖത3. In contrast, when we consider a 
relatively high poverty line such as ݖതଶ ൌ 12, the two modified GL curves cross, as shown by 
the dotted lines in Figure 2 (c). This implies that condition (D5) does not satisfied, and thus 
there exists a poverty index ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺܢതሻ for ݖതଵ ൒ ݖതଶ ൌ 12 ൒ ݖത3 such that ௑ܲ െ ௒ܲ ൏ 0.  
 
[Figure 2 placed here] 
 
 
5 Empirical Illustrations 
In this section, we apply the procedure described in the previous sections to the income 
distributions of Italian households in 2006 and 2012. The data used for this illustration come 
from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. We 
employed the data described in the Historical Database (version 8.0) of the SHIW. The sample 
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size is 7768 in the 2006 survey and 8151 in the 2012 survey.11  
Our analysis is based on the net disposable income (excluding income from financial 
assets), which is denoted as Y1 in the SHIW. The income unit used in the analysis is a 
household, that is, the cumulative number of income units is measured by household. In the 
dataset, there are a few households whose incomes are negative; we replaced these with zero 
income.  
We partitioned the total sample into five subgroups, based on the number of members of 
each household. This may be too simple to capture the heterogeneity of households. However, 
we used this simple classification scheme since the equivalence scale recently used by OECD is 
also based on only household size.12 The subgroups consist of one, two, three, four, and five or 
more persons. Based on the literature, we assumed that need increases with the number of 
household members: a household with five or more persons thus belongs to the first subgroup.  
The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. All of these statistics were calculated 
using the microdata adjusted by the sampling weight.13 The consumer price index (CPI) that 
had a base year of 2005 was used for transforming the nominal income into the real income.14 
From Table 1, we can see that the household size decreased: the proportion of single households 
considerably increased while those of others decreased, with the exception of households of five 
or more persons. We can verify that the average income in 2012 was smaller than that in 2006. 
That is, the income distribution seen in 2012 was never dominated by that of 2006 in the sense 
of the extended SGL. 
 
[Table 1 placed here] 
 
Before presenting the investigation using the extended SGL criterion, let us consider the 
GL curve based on equivalent incomes. We will use the same equivalence scale as that used by 
the OECD: equivalent income is defined to be the income divided by the square root of the 
number of household members. Figure 1 shows the GL curves for 2006 and 2012 based on the 
equivalent income: note that the income distribution of 2006 dominates that of 2012 in the sense 
of the GL criterion. However, note that this result depends on the particular equivalence scale 
that is used.  
 
                                                  
11 When we wish to compare distributions that have populations of different sizes, our procedure can be easily 
extended by constructing replicated distributions that have populations of same size. In this situation, the social 
evaluation function must have replication invariance, as is usually assumed for GL comparisons with populations of 
different size.  
12 For example, see OECD (2012). 
13 We used the PESOFIT in the SHIW as the sampling weight.  
14 The CPIs were 102.22 for 2006 and 117.53 for 2012. 
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[Figure 3 placed here] 
 
We turn now to the welfare dominance in line with the extended SGL criterion. First, we 
must determine the income levels that result in the same utility for the different subgroups. 
Since our main goal is to illustrate the extended SGL criterion, we simply set as ̅ݒ ൌ 788500 
euro; this is approximately the maximum level of income in the data for 2006 and 2012. 
The GL curves for various subgroups are presented in Figure 4. From this figure, we can 
confirm that the extended SGL condition is violated: two distributions are not rankable. In 
particular, except for the neediest group, shown in Fig. 4 (a), and distribution of all data, shown 
in Fig. 4 (e), the GL curves cross. Thus, if we partition the households as those with five or 
more persons and all other households, the distribution for 2012 is dominated by that of 2006 
according to the extended SGL criterion. However, when we allow for any differences between 
the various types of households, the dominance relations are not clear.  
 
[Figure 4 placed here] 
 
Next, we analyze the poverty gap. We set the poverty line for single households at 11250 
euro, based on the 2005 consumer price: ݖହ̅ ൌ 11250. This poverty line is approximately equal 
to the average per capita income in 2006 and 2012. Based on this poverty line for single-person 
households, we set ݖ௛̅ ൌ 11250 ൈ ሺ6 െ ݄ሻ for ݄ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ. 
Figure 5 shows the modified GL curves based on ුܠ௛ and ුܡ௛ for ݄ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ. In the 
analysis of welfare dominance, we already saw that the distribution of all of the data for 2012 is 
dominated by that of 2006 in the sense of GL. This implies that ܩܮሺුܠ5, ݌ሻ ൒ ܩܮሺුܡ5, ݌ሻ, 
∀݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ holds for any poverty line ݖହ̅. Therefore, we present the GL curves for ݆ ൌ 1,… ,4. 
We can see that every modified GL curve for 2012 is dominated by that of 2006. That is, the 
distribution of 2012 is poverty dominated by that of 2006.    
 
[Figure 5 placed here] 
 
 
5 Discussion 
In this paper, we propose a simple condition for the extended SGL that was proposed by Jenkins 
and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998). The procedure presented here can be 
easily implemented by comparison of the GL curves. This result is not surprising. It is 
well-known that the second-order stochastic dominance condition and its corresponding inverse 
condition are equivalent. In addition, the second order inverse function coincides with the GL 
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function. Since the extended SGL condition is characterized by the second-order stochastic 
dominance condition, the condition is also represented by using the GL curve. This fact suggests 
that the dominance conditions other than the extended SGL can be represented by using the GL 
curves as long as the condition is based on the second-order stochastic dominance.    
    Moyes (2012) pointed out that the result of the comparisons may be changed by the choice 
of the upper bound of the income applied to the distribution functions. This difficulty is caused 
by assumption U2. Indeed, Moyes (2012) considered the following condition UM instead of U2.  
 
UM ܷሺݕ, 1ሻ ൑ ܷሺݕ, 2ሻ ൑,… ,൑ ܷሺݕ, ܪሻ, ∀ݕ ൑ ̅ݒ.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2, conditions U1 and U2 imply condition UM. According to Moyes 
(2012), we introduce the following class of utility function: 
 
 ࣯ெ ൌ ሼܷ ∈ ࣯:U1, UM and U3 are satisfiedሽ  
 
Moyes (2012) has established that ௑ܹ ൒ ௒ܹ	∀ܷ ∈ ࣯ெ is equivalent to the following 
condition BM (Moyes, 2012. Proposition 3.2): 
 
 ܨ௑ሺ̅ݒ, ݄ሻ ൑ ܨ௒ሺ̅ݒ, ݄ሻ ∀݄ ∈ ࣢\ሼܪሽ. (BM1)
 
 න ሾܨ௑ሺߦ, ݄ሻ െ ܨ௒ሺߦ, ݄ሻሿ݀ߦ
௧
଴
൑ 0 ∀ݐ ൑ ̅ݒ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢. (BM2)
 
While condition (BM2) is the same as condition (B’), condition (BM1) requires that ෩ܰ௑ሺ݄ሻ ൑
෩ܰ௒ሺ݄ሻ	∀݄ ∈ ࣢\ሼܪሽ . Fleurbaey et al. (2003) argued that Jenkins’ and Lambet’s criterion 
coincides with Moyes’ one when ̅ݒ approaches to infinity15. It is possible to compare the 
distributions based on the GL curves presented in section 2. In Figure 1, we can test the Moye’s 
criterion by comparing two solid lines. In this case, Moyes’ criterion does not hold because 
ܨ௑ሺ̅ݒ, 2ሻ ൐ ܨ௒ሺ̅ݒ, 2ሻ. 
We also argued that the poverty gap dominance can be tested by using the modified GL 
curves. Chambaz and Maurin (1998) showed that ௑ܲ ൑ ௒ܲ	∀ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺܢതሻ, ܢത ∈ ࣴ is equivalent 
to ௑ܲ ൑ ௒ܲ	∀ܲ ∈ ஼࣪ெሺܢത′ሻ, ∀ܢതᇱ ൑ ܢത, ܢതᇱ ∈ ࣴ. In the GL curve comparison presented in here, 
since ௛݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ݖ௛ᇱ െ ሺݖ௛ᇱ െ ݔሻା ൌ min	ሼݖ௛ᇱ , ݔሽ	 is increasing concave in ݔ , ∑ ුݔ௝௛௥௝ୀଵ ൒ ∑ ුݕ௝௛௥௝ୀଵ  
for ݎ ൌ 1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢  implies ∑ ݂ሺුݔ௝௛ሻ௥௝ୀଵ ൒ ∑ ݂ሺුݕ௝௛ሻ௥௝ୀଵ  for ݎ ൌ 1,… , ෡ܰሺ݄ሻ, ∀݄ ∈ ࣢ 
(See Marshall et al. 2011. Theorem A.2., p.167). Noting that ܢതᇱ ൑ ܢത and ܢതᇱ ∈ ࣴ, we can confirm 
                                                  
15 See Remark 5.1 in Fleurbaey et al.(2003). 
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that (D4) holds for the distribution generated by ܢതᇱ. Thus, (D5) for ܢത ∈ ࣴ is equivalent to 
ܮሺුܠ′݄, ݌ሻ ൒ ܩܮሺුܡ′݄, ݌ሻ ∀ܢതᇱ ൑ ܢത, ܢതᇱ ∈ ࣴ. 
As stressed in Foster and Shorrocks (1988), welfare and poverty dominance criteria share 
the common feature of stochastic dominance. This linkage is also observed in the present 
analysis: the extended SGL condition for both welfare and poverty dominances can be tested by 
the GL curves. Furthermore, it should be noted that if the poverty index ܲሺݕ, ݖሻ belongs to 
େ࣪୑ሺܢ∗ሻ and ܢ∗ ൌ ሺ̅ݒ, … , ̅ݒሻ, then െܲሺݕ, ݖሻ ∈ ࣯௃௅	. This feature suggests that the maximum 
conceivable income imposed in the welfare dominance condition can be flexibly set to the 
different sub-groups. Although such generalization may not be applicable as long as the 
difference in needs originates from the number of household members, it is expected to extend 
the applicability of the SGL criterion by incorporating different demographic condition to each 
sub-group. 
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 1 Comparisons of GL curves for welfare dominance 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
ݖ̅ଶ ൌ 6 
(b) 
ݖ̅ଶ ൌ 12 
(c) 
Figure 2 Comparisons of GL curves for poverty dominance 
 
 
Table 1 Distribution of Income in the SHIW
Number of 
household 
members 
Share of 
subgroups 
Mean 
(Euro) 
Max. 
(Euro) 
Min. 
(Euro) C.V. 
2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012
1 24.91  28.29  19474  15736 788495 185655 0 0  1.650  1.174 
2 28.42  27.93  29583  26215 462111 231651 -8511 -851  1.194  1.203 
3 21.52  19.38  35873  32499 385942 273122 0 0  1.156  1.218 
4 18.48  17.66  39449  31714 637840 189526 0 0  1.345  1.173 
5 or more 6.67  6.73  41156  31362 524359 185110 704 0  1.387  1.219 
Total 100.00  100.00  31014  25786 788495 273122 -8511 -851  1.337  1.239 
Source: Author’s calculations from the SHIW historical data (version 8).  
C.V. is the coefficient of variation. All income variables are deflated by the CPI (2005=100). 
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Figure 3  Comparison of GL curves based on equivalent income 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW historical data. 
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(a) Five or more household members (b) Four or more household members 
 
(c) Three or more household members (d) Two or more household members 
 
(e) All households  
Figure 4  Welfare comparisons using the modified GL curves  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW historical data. 
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(a) Five or more household members (b) Four or more household members 
(c) Three or more household members (d) Two or more household members 
Figure 5  Poverty dominance evaluated by using the modified GL curves  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW historical data. 
 
